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tigating unrelated charges and question the defendant on one of the
charges with knowledge that he is represented on the other. Such
an interpretation, however, would be inconsistent with the line of
decisions which have recognized an exception to the unrelated
charge rule only where the defendant is questioned after being detained on a contrived charge.158
In the final analysis, the Ermo decision is probably best interpreted as an indication that the courts will scrutinize police procedures closely in instances where a defendant is interrogated by the
same team of law enforcement agents in connection with unrelated
charges. In such instances, the possibility of police misconduct in
the absence of the defendant's attorney is sufficiently serious to
justify heightened judicial suspicion. Thus, when police misconduct does not fit within one of the traditional legal theories that
would mandate suppression, the courts may nevertheless intervene
when the misconduct violates fundamental notions of fairness.
Ronald S. Meckler
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAw

DRL § 248: Cohabitationalone not sufficient to authorize
termination of alimony payments
Section 248 of the Domestic Relations Law empowers a court,
in its discretion, to terminate a wife's alimony159 upon proof that she
' See note 133 supra. The Ermo court could not rely on the "pretext" exception to
suppress the confessions since the assault charge was legitimate and not a mere contrivance
with which to detain the defendant for further questioning on the unrelated murder charge.
I Generally, only a wife may receive an alimony award in a matrimonial action. See
DRL § 236; FAm. CT. AcT § 412 (McKinney 1975). Under normal circumstances, the husband
has no equivalent right to support. The husband may be entitled to receive support from his
wife, however, if he becomes a recipient of public assistance before the marriage is dissolved.
Id. § 415 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978). The statutory obligation of a husband to provide
support is based upon a legislative assumption that a wife may suffer severe economic hardship as a result of a divorce. The statutory alimony provisions were intended to protect the
wife and prevent her from becoming a ward of the community. See Phillips v. Phillips, 1 App.
Div. 2d 393, 150 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 742, 138 N.E.2d 738, 157
N.Y.S.2d 378 (1956); Kolmer v. Kolmer, 19 Misc. 2d 298, 305, 191 N.Y.S.2d 324, 331 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1959). Under DRL § 236, the court may award alimony to a woman in any
matrimonial action. FAM. CT. AcT § 412 provides that "[a] husband is chargeable with the
support of his wife and

. . .

may be required to pay.

. .

a fair and reasonable sum, as the

court may determine. . . ." A wife is not entitled to alimony, however, if she is found guilty
of misconduct which "would itself constitute grounds for separation or divorce." DRL § 236.
DRL § 236 provides that, in making an alimony award, the court may consider such
factors as the "length. . . of the marriage, [and] the ability of the wife to be self-supporting
.... " In addition, DRL § 236 and F m. CT. AcT. § 466 (McKinney 1975) permit the court
to modify a prior support order if the parties' circumstances have changed significantly. See
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is "habitually living with another man and holding herself out as
his wife ... ."I" Recently, in Northrup v. Northrup,' the Court

of Appeals interpreted this provision narrowly and held that sharing
by an ex-wife of residence, bedroom, household expenses and use of
her car with a paramour for more than six months was insufficient
as a matter of law to constitute the requisite "holding out" so as to
permit relief pursuant to section 248.162

In an earlier action, plaintiff Anna Northrup was granted a
divorce and the right to receive monthly alimony payments from
defendant Ray Northrup.'63 When the defendant failed to make the
required payments, the plaintiff initiated an action to recover arrears.'64 Contending that his ex-wife was living openly with another
man, the defendant cross-moved to have the alimony provisions in
the divorce decree stricken pursuant to DRL § 248.165 Upon a hearing
of the defendant's motion, the Supreme Court, Monroe County,
found that, for approximately six months, the plaintiff had lived
with another man, shared his bedroom, cooked his meals, did his
Fisher v. Fisher, 56 App. Div. 2d 547, 391 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1st Dep't 1977) (mem.); Berry v.
Berry, 56 App. Div. 2d 522, 391 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1st Dep't 1977). Further, under DRL § 246(1),
if the husband is financially unable to provide the court ordered support payments, he may
apply to the court for temporary or permanent relief and thereby avoid a contempt citation.
In New York, a former wife's right to receive alimony is purely statutory; no equivalent
common law right exists. See Weintraub v. Weintraub, 302 N.Y. 104, 96 N.E.2d 724 (1951);
Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E.2d 423 (1943); Leitman v. Leitman, 21 Misc. 2d 653,
655, 190 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), aff'd mem., 9 App. Div. 2d 682, 192
N.Y.S.2d 490 (2d Dep't 1959). Thus, in determining whether to award alimony or modify an
existing support award, the courts are guided solely by the provisions of the relevant statutes.
See, e.g., Waddey v. Waddey, 290 N.Y. 251, 49 N.E.2d 8 (1943); Hayes v. Hayes, 220 N.Y.
596, 115 N.E. 1040 (1917) (mem.).
160DRL § 248 provides in pertinent part:
The court in its discretion upon application of the husband on notice, upon proof
that the wife is habitually living with another man and holding herself out as his
wife, although not married to such man, may modify such final judgment and any
orders made with respect thereto by annulling the provisions of such final judgment
or orders or of both, directing payment of money for the support of such wife.
In the event of the former wife's remarriage, however, the court has no discretionary powers.
Upon application by the husband, the court "must modify" the decree by eliminating any
alimony provisions. DRL § 248. See, e.g., Reichel v. Sollazzo, 38 Misc. 2d 217, 238 N.Y.S.2d
140 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963). See generally 2 H. FoSTER & D. FREED, LAW AND THE
FAMILY § 26:6 (1966). For a review of the legislative history of DRL § 248, see notes 181-184
infra.
18143 N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1978), rev'g 52 App. Div. 2d 1093,
384 N.Y.S.2d 319 (4th Dep't 1976) (mem.).
1"IId. at 572, 373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
113 Id. at 569, 373 N.E.2d at 1222, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 998. The defendant was ordered to
pay plaintiff $160 per month for her support.
I Id. The defendant defaulted on the alimony order after having made two payments.
165Id.
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laundry, furnished him use of her car and shared household expenses. 166 After concluding that the evidence established that the plaintiff was habitually living with another man, the trial court interpreted the "holding out" provision of DRL § 248 to include conduct
which would lead people to believe that the parties were husband
and wife."6 7 Finding that the plaintiff's actions satisfied this test,
although she had never publicly represented the relationship as a
marriage,' the court terminated the alimony provision.'69 The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously affirmed, holding that living together "in what might reasonably be considered a
marital relationship" was sufficient to constitute "holding out"
under section 248.17° In the appellate division's view, DRL § 248
"does not require the husband to prove that his former wife made
affirmative representations to third parties that she and her para17
mour were married."'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the facts
were insufficient as a matter of law to constitute "holding out"
within the meaning of DRL § 248.112 Writing for the majority, 17
Judge Cooke stated that the issue was "purely one of statutory
construction," since modification of an alimony provision is not
permitted absent the type of conduct contemplated by the statute. 74 Observing that the two-part test of DRL § 248 requires both
habitual cohabitation and "holding out," the Northrup Court was
unwilling to apply the provisions of the statute where only cohabitation had been shown. 175 Although Judge Cooke acknowledged that
"holding out" does not require oral proclamations by a former wife
with respect to her marital status, he indicated that some form of
affirmative representation is necessary to satisfy the conditions set

"d'
Id.,

373 N.E.2d at 1222-23, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 998.

"I Id. at 570, 373 N.E.2d at 1223, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
Ids Id.

"'The supreme court, however, held defendant in contempt for his prior failure to make
the alimony payments. Id.
17052 App. Div. 2d at 1093, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
171Id.

," 43 N.Y.2d at 572, 373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
m Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Fuchsberg, Jasen and Jones concurred in the majority
opinion.
1743 N.Y.2d at 570, 373 N.E.2d at 1223, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999 (citing Hayes v. Hayes,
220 N.Y. 596, 115 N.E. 1040 (1917) (meri.)). See also Leffler v. Leffler, 50 App. Div. 2d 93,
376 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1st Dep't 1975), aff'd mem., 40 N.Y.2d 1036, 360 N.E.2d 355, 391 N.Y.S.2d
855 (1976); Wechter v. Wechter, 50 App. Div. 2d 826, 376 N.Y.S.2d 180 (2d Dep't 1975), affl'd,
40 N.Y.2d 964, 359 N.E.2d 428, 390 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1976).
"1 43 N.Y.2d at 571-72, 373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1000; see Rosenberg v.
Rosenberg, 46 Misc. 2d 693, 260 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1965).
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forth in the statute. 7 ' The Court conceded that under this rule, a
former wife who is cohabiting could "avoid the loss of her alimony
by tailoring her conduct," but concluded that a solution to the
problem would have to come from the legislature.177
Judge Wachtler, writing for the dissent,7 8 refused to interpret
179
DRL § 248 "in such a narrow, technical and unrealistic manner.
"1' 43 N.Y.2d at 571, 373 N.E.2d at 1223, 402 N.Y.S.2d at'999. The Court gave two
examples of the type of conduct by an ex-wife that would be sufficient to establish a "holding
out": "(1) applying for a telephone, designating [the paramour] as her spouse and asking
that she be listed in the directory with his surname; and (2) changing the names on their
joint checking account so that she uses [her paramour's] surname." Id. (citing Lang v.
Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 3d 852, 126 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1975)). Although the Northrup Court
stated that these examples were "not meant to suggest a limitation," they do demonstrate
the Court's adherence to a literal interpretation of the "holding out" requirement. 43 N.Y.2d
at 571, 373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999. See also note 184 infra.
The Court cited with approval the meaning given to "holding out" in Stern v. Stern, 88
Misc. 2d 860, 389 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976), which was decided after the
fourth department's affirmance of the trial court's decision in Northrup. 43 N.Y.2d at 571,
373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999. In Stern the defendant husband established that
the plaintiff wife and her paramour resided together and shared the same bedroom for at least
one year, shared all household expenses, registered on two occasions in hotels as husband and
wife, visited their respective families together, visited the plaintiffs daughter at summer
camp and went on several vacations together. The supreme court found this conduct did not
meet the requirements necessary to terminate alimony under DRL § 248 because the plaintiff
and her paramour were "always careful not to hold themselves out or refer to themselves as
Mr. and Mrs. Rowen." 88 Misc. 2d at 861-63, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67. The hotel registrations
were viewed by the Stern court as "isolated incidents." Id. at 862, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The
Stern court distinguished the appellate division decision in Northrup, noting that "there the
court apparently used the fact that the former wife was living with another man as the basis
for a presumption that she had made affirmative representations to third parties that she and
her paramour were'married." No such presumption was available in Stem, since the ex-wife
and paramour in that case "went to great lengths to inform the world that they were not
husband and wife." Id. at 864, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
'"743 N.Y.2d at 572, 373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1000. In its brief review of the
legislative history of DRL § 248, the Northrup majority simply noted that "[tlhe forerunner
to the present statute was specifically enacted to counteract a situation where a woman, who
represented that she was married to the man with whom she was living, was held entitled to
alimony because she had not, in fact, remarried." 43 N.Y.2d at 571, 373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 999.
"TA
43 N.Y.2d at 572, 373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1000 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
Judge Gabrielli joined in the dissenting opinion.
"I Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting). While conceding that the courts can not rewrite a
statute, Judge Wachtler stated that the legislature "intended the courts to recognize current
social realities in applying the statute." Id. at 573, 373 N.E.2d at 1225, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1000
(Wachtler, J., dissenting). In support of this view, Judge Wachtler cited N.Y. STATUTES §§
143-144 (McKinney 1971). Section 143 provides: "The courts should strive to avoid a construction which would make a statute unreasonable, or lead to unreasonable results." Section
144 states: "A construction which would render a statute ineffective must be avoided, and
as between two constructions of an act, one of which renders it practically nugatory and the
other enables the evident purposes of the Legislature to be effectuated, the latter is preferred." N.Y. STATUTES § 144 (McKinney 1971).
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Such an interpretation, the dissent contended, represented a failure
to recognize current social norms "andthe legislative history of DRL
§ 248.180 As originally enacted, the statute permitted termination of
an alimony order only upon the wife's remarriage."' Following a
lower court's ruling that the effect of the statute was limited to
situations in which the ex-wife entered into a ceremonial marriage,
and thus did not encompass conduct resembling common law marriage, 8 ' the legislature amended the statutes' to include habitual
living together and "holding out." '84 The Northrup majority's narrow reading of the statute, in the dissent's view, renders the liberalizing provisions of DRL § 248 a "dead letter" by setting an unrealistic standard of proof for establishing the requisite holding out.ss
According to Judge Wachtler, the statute should be interpreted so
as to give effect to the underlying legislative purpose of permitting
"the courts to consider the extent of the wife's new relationship
without respect to formalities." 88
' 43 N.Y.2d at 573, 373 N.E.2d at 1225, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1000 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).

, See CPA, ch. 220, § 1, [1934] N.Y. Laws 703.
See Waddey v. Waddey, 168 Misc. 904, 6 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1938),
aff'd mem., 259 App. Div. 852, 20 N.Y.S.2d 406 (2d Dep't 1940), rev'd on othergrounds, 290
N.Y. 251, 49 N.E.2d 8 (1943). In Waddey, the court held that an ex-wife who was living with
a man without being formally married, was entitled to continued alimony payments under
the existing statute. 168 Misc. at 907, 6 N.Y.S.2d at 165; CPA, ch. 220, § 1, [1934] N.Y.
Laws 703. The language presently contained in DRL § 248 was adopted in response to the
controversy engendered by the Waddey decision. For a detailed discussion of the events
leading to the 1938 amendment, see Citron v. Citron, 91 Misc. 2d 785, 789-91, 398 N.Y.S.2d
624, 626-28 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1977).
"
Ch. 161, § 1, [1938] N.Y. Laws 682.
'' See Stern v. Stern, 88 Misc. 2d 860, 389 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976).
Common law marriage, which was abolished by statute in New York, see ch. 606, [1933]
N.Y. Laws 1268, generally was established by proof of cohabitation, mutual agreement to be
married and holding out. See Graham v. Graham, 211 App. Div. 580, 207 N.Y.S. 195 (2d Dep't
1924); Dodge v. Campbell, 135 Misc. 644, 238 N.Y.S. 666 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1929),
affl'd, 229 App. Div. 534, 242 N.Y.S. 534 (3d Dep't 1930), affl'd, 255 N.Y. 622, 175 N.E. 340
(1931). Since the essence of common law marriage was the intention of the parties, proof of
cohabitation and community reputation was not alone sufficient to establish that a man and
woman were husband and wife. See 211 App. Div. at 584, 207 N.Y.S. at 198. Moreover, a
couple's failure to publicly represent themselves as husband and wife was strong evidence
that they did not intend to be bound in a marital relationship. See, e.g., In re Anderson's
Estate, 263 App. Div. 838, 31 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1941); In re Heitman, 154
Misc. 838, 279 N.Y.S. 108 (Sur. Ct: Niagara County 1935), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 855, 288
N.Y.S. 876 (4th Dep't), aff'd 272 N.Y. 533, 4 N.E.2d 435 (1936). It is submitted that the
Northrup majority may have had this test in mind when it construed the "holding out"
requirement of DRL § 248. See note 176 and accompanying text supra.
283 43 N.Y.2d at 573, 373 N.E.2d at 1225, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1000 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
'1 Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge Wachtler stressed that where the wife has not
entered into a ceremonial marriage, the ex-husband has no automaticright to be relieved of
his obligation. In his view, DRL § 248 gives the court discretion to eliminate an alimony award
882
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It is submitted that the Court of Appeals has unnecessarily
construed DRL § 248 to require a standard of proof which is inconsistent with the policy considerations underlying the statute.187 An
alimony order is originally granted by a court because of the financial need of the former wife. 18 When this need no longer exists, the
objective justification for the payments is at an end. Since the
courts have been given broad discretion to include provisions for
alimony in matrimonial judgments,'8 9 similar power should be recognized for terminating payments under the provisions of DRL §
248.
It is suggested that the discretionary provision of DRL § 248 can
be applied, so as to advance the interests it seeks to protect,19 without predicating termination on the affirmative representations of
the benefited party."' By holding that, as a matter of law, conduct
where there has been no remarriage if the circumstances indicate that such a result would
avoid injustice. 43 N.Y.2d at 573, 373 N.E.2d at 1225, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
187 See note 159 supra. In In re Anonymous, 90 Misc. 2d 801, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Family
Ct. Nassau County 1977), plaintiff wife brought suit to enforce the support provision of her
divorce decree. Her ex-husband cross-petitioned pursuant to DRL § 248 and established that
the wife and paramour resided together, socialized as a couple, and shared the food shopping
and routine household chores. Id. at 804, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 1004. The court concluded that the
life style of the wife and paramour reasonably led to an inference that a marital relationship
existed. Id. The majority in Northrup, however, specifically disapproved this holding and
rejected the relevance of "life style" evidence in establishing "holding out." 43 N.Y.2d at 571,
373 N.E.2d at 1223, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
Despite the Court's assertion to the contrary, this rejection of "life style" evidence seems
to indicate that the Northrup decision requires that the ex-husband show some affirmative
representations by the wife in order to prove "holding out." It is submitted that this is exactly
the type of formality that the legislature was trying to minimize when it enacted the 1938
amendment. See notes 179-183 and accompanying text supra.
"
See note 159 supra.
"' See, e.g., Berlin v. Berlin, 36 App. Div. 2d 763, 321 N.Y.S.2d 511 (2d Dep't), appeal
dismissed, 28 N.Y.2d 986, 272 N.E.2d 339, 323 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1971); Brownstein v. Brownstein, 25 App. Div. 2d 205, 268 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1st Dep't 1966). See also Tornese v. Tornese,
55 App. Div. 2d 602, 389 N.Y.S.2d 385 (2d Dep't 1976).
11 Under DRL § 248, the court should be able to examine the quality of the ex-wife's
new relationship and make a determination regarding its stability. If the court finds that a
marital relationship exists it should be able to use its discretionary powers and annul the
alimony provision.
In view of the uproar following the Waddey decision, see note 182 supra, it is possible
to argue that, if the Northrup case had arisen forty years ago, the husband would have been
granted the requested relief under the amended version of CPA § 1159. In 1938, marriage was
a rigidly observed norm and conduct resembling a marital relationship was likely to be
deemed a "holding out" as husband and wife. In 1978, however, society has begun to recognize
a broad variety of life styles. The courts are thus less likely to infer that a de facto marriage
exists when a man and woman share a bedroom and household expenses. It is submitted that
this change in social mores has made it more difficult for an ex-husband to show the requisite
"holding out" and thereby obtain relief under DRL § 248, despite the fact that his ex-wife
may no longer need the alimony payments.
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evincing a marital relationship is not sufficient to constitute
"holding out" under DRL § 248, the Northrup Court has effectively
placed a bar to the use of judicial discretion in cases where injustice
may result.
Unfortunately, the problem raised by the Northrup holding
does not lend itself readily to legislative solution. While the legislature can act to amend the statutory language requiring "holding
out," '92 it would be impossible to provide detailed standards to be
utilized in determining whether a particular relationship justifies
invocation of the relief provisions of DRL § 248. Such standards can
be developed only on a case by case basis. It is therefore suggested
that, in deciding future cases arising under DRL § 248, the courts
should give the broadest possible effect to the concession of the
Northrup majority that "conduct may constitute a holding out."' 93
Lawrence J. Santoro
WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW

WCL § 29: 1975 amendments to Worker's CompensationLaw held
applicable to actions accruingor commenced prior to effective date
Section 29 of the Worker's Compensation Law'94 allows an injured employee to claim compensation benefits without forfeiting
the right to bring an action against a nonemployee tortfeasor.'95
"143 N.Y.2d at 573, 373 N.E.2d at 1225, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
One month after Northrup was decided, the New York State Senate unanimously passed a
bill which would allow courts to eliminate alimony even though the former wife had not
represented herself to be married to her paramour. N.Y. Times, March 19, 1978, at 45, col.
5. Similar legislation was introduced in the Assembly, but did not receive sufficient support
for passage.
, 43 N.Y.2d at 571, 373 N.E.2d at 1223, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999; see note 177 supra.
'" The New York Legislature recently amended the short title of the Workmen's Compensation Law to read "Worker's Compensation Law." Ch. 79, [1978] N.Y. Laws 253
(McKinney).
M"N.Y. WoRK. Comp. LAW § 29(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978) provides in pertinent
part:
If an employee entitled to compensation. . . be injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, such injured employee, or in case
of death, his dependents, need not elect whether to take compensation and medical
benefits under [workmen's compensation] or to pursue his remedy against such
other but may take such compensation and medical benefits and. . . pursue his
remedy against such other subject to the provisions of this chapter . . . . [Tihe
state insurance fund. . . or insurance carrier liable for the payment of. . . compensation . . . shall have a lien on the proceeds of any recovery . . . whether by
judgment, settlement or otherwise, after the deduction of the reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorney's fees, incurred in effecting such recovery, to

